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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

No. 16934

DAVID M. BALLS and RICHARD
s. JOHNS II, co-partners,
dba UTAH EXCAVATING,
Defendant-Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this case plaintiff, as lessor, seeks to recover
$13,889 .64 for rent under an "Equipment Rental Agreement"
from defendants who were co-partners doing business as Utah
Excavating, as lessee, and $127.35 for repair work performed
on the rental equipment which was a Drott, Model SOD Excavator.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter was tried on the merits on January 15,
1980, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge,
at the conclusion of which judgment was entered that the plaintiff take nothing on its claim for rent, having found that the
"Equipment Rental Agreement" was intended for security and
subject to the default requirements of the Utah Uniform Commer-
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cial Code with which plaintiff had failed to comply by not
giving defendants notice of sale after repossessing the
equipment.

Judgment in the airount of $127.35 was granted

to plaintiff on its claim for repairs.

The plaintiff has

appealled from the judgment denying its claim for rent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants respectfully submit that the judgment
of the Lower Court should be affirmed and that the appeal
of the plaintiff should be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.

On December 30, 1977, Arnold Machinery Company (hereafter
"Arnold") leased to Utah Excavating, a partnership between
Richard S. Johns II (hereafter "Johns") and David M. Balls
(hereafter "Balls"), a Drott, Model· SOD Excavator for a minimum
period of six months and thereafter until the lease was terminated according to the terms and provisions stated in the
agreement.

The rental was $3,900 per month during the minimum

rental period and continued at the same rate thereafter.
(Ex. 1-P) Utah Excavating was also required to pay property
tax, sales tax and insurance, making a total monthly payment
of $4, 273. 73.

(Ex. 3-P).

The parties also executed a "Rental

Equipment Purchase Option" which provided that 100% of all
rentals would apply on the purchase price which was the total

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

of (1) a purchase price at the beginning of the lease of
$92,2·20,

(2) a purchase option charge of 1-1/4% of $92,220

per month until the option was exercised,

(3) repair costs

incurred by Arnold, and (4) any taxes charged against the
equipment.

The option to purchase was to continue and could

be exercised at any time until the termination of the "Equipment Rental Agreement."

(Ex. 2-P).

The excavator was a used piece of equipment which
had been purchased by Arnold some nine months earlier in April,
1977.

(T. 135).

At the time it was purchased by Arnold it

had a retail value of $98,000.

(T. 135).

It had been used

as a demonstrator model in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and had also
been rented.

(T. 164).

Arnold flew Mr. Balls to Idaho Falls

to examine the excavator in an effort to get him to purchase
it.

( T. 2 24 ) •
Sometime later Mr. Byerline, a salesman of Arnold,

and Mr. Johns and Mr. Balls discussed the purchase of the
excavator and it was explained that a 20% down payment would
be required on a conditional sale.

(T. 130}.

Utah Excavating

did not have the required down payment but still wanted to
purchase the excavator.

{T. 263).

Mr. Byerline suggested

entering into a lease with an option to purchase so that "by
the equity they were building up by their monthly rental payments" they would have paid enough to constitute a down payment
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-4in six months.

(T. 131).

If all went as planned i t was

contemplated that the option to purchase would be exercised
after the down payment was accrued if Utah Excavating could
arrange for financing of a purchase.

(T. 171).

Mr. Byerline

indicated that they were not required to exercise the option
to purchase at six months, but they could continue to rent if
they desired.

(T. 171).

Mr. Byerline was willing for them to

continue to rent beyond six months as long as they kept current
in their payments.

(T. 139) •

Arnold filed a financing state-

ment with the Secretary of State (T. 78).
Utah Excavating made a payment upon receiving the
equipment by a check which failed to clear the bank.

There-

after, they made two payments in February, 1978, a payment in
June, 19 78, and a payment in July, 1978.

(Ex. 4-P, 9-D).

The

total payments made by Utah Excavating amounted to $17,103.32.
(T.

103).
During June and July, 1978, Arnold made several con-

tacts with Utah Excavating to get them to bring their payments
current.

Then in August Arnold requ,ested that Utah Excavating

return the equipment, which Mr. Balls did on August 22.

(T.

317, 318).
Even after the equipment was repossessed Arnold expresse
the willingness to return the equipment to Utah Excavating if
the payments were brought current and Arnold also encouraged
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-5Mr. Balls to exercise the option to purchase.

(T. 318, 321).

Mr. Balls attempted to obtain financing to exercise the option
(T. 256, 257), but before he could do so, on September 7, 1978,
Arnold had entered into an agreement to lease the equipment
with an option to purchase to Salt Lake County for $4,400 per
month at a purchase price of $85,000 and an option charge of
1% of $85,000 per month with 100% of the monthly lease payment
to apply on the purchase price.

(Ex. 7-D).

Arnold did not give Utah Excavating notice that i t
was entering into the lease-option to purchase agreement with
Salt Lake CQUnty, or that i t intended to dispose of the equipment.

(T. 79, 148, 149, 203).
Arnold received five rent payments from Salt Lake

County totaling $22,000 and in March, 1979, Salt Lake County
purchased the equipment for $66,400 after requesting bids as
required by law.

(T. 97, 142, Ex. 10-D).

At the trial it was stipulated between the parties
that if Utah Excavating exercised their option to purchase
the equipment after December 30, 1977, then to do so at the
following times they would have to have paid the following
amounts plus the cost of any major repairs for normal wear
and tear paid by Arnold up until the time the option was
exercised:

after six months -

$75,736.50; after twelve months -

$59,253; after fifteen months - $51,011.25; after twenty-four
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-6(T. 90-92).

months - $26,286.

It was further stipulated by

the parties that the actual cost for repairs performed during
the first six months was $736.96.

(T. 90).

After 36 months the purchase option price would have
been calculated as follows (T. 43):
Purchase Price

$ 92,220.00

Plus Purchase Option Charge
($92,200 x 1-1/4% x 36):

41, 499. 00

Subtotal

- 13 3, 719 • 0 0

Less 100% of Rental Payments ($3,900 x 36):

140,400.00

Excess of Rental Payments Over Option Price
Available to be Applied Against Cost of
Major Repairs for Normal Wear and Tear
Paid by Plaintiff Until Option Exercised

(6,681.00)

'!he cost of major repairs for normal wear and tear on
equipment like the one involved herein was reasonably estimated
to be between $1,500 and $3,000 per year.

(T. 29 7) •

The

reasonable useful life of the equipment was between 8000 and
9000 hours of operation under normal conditions.

(T. 137, 224).

Normal useage of the equipment would be between 1500 and 2000
hours per year.

(T. 137).

'lhe equipment would have a useful

life of between five to six years before a major overhaul would
be required.

(T. 137).

The fair market value of the equipment on and after
December 30, 1977, at the following times was estimated to be:
On December 30, 1977 - $92,220 (T. 233); after six months -
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-7$90,000 (T. 236); after twelve months -

$85-86,000

(~.

244);

after fifteen months - $80-81,000 (T. 245); after twenty-four
months -

$77-78,000 (T. 245); and after thirty-six months -

$70,000 (T. 314).

At the time Utah Excavating executed the

"Equipment Rental Agreement" Mr. Balls anticipated the equipment would have those fair market values.
B.

(T.

245).

FACTS STATED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT ARNOLD IN ITS

BRIEF WITH WHICH DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS DISAGREE.
Utah Excavating's financial situation was not typical
of the 75 to 80 percent who do not exercise the option to purchase.

(T. 133).

Most of those who do not exercise the option

have only a temporary need for the equipment.

(T. 134).

There

is no testimony from Mr. Balls or Mr. Johns that the reason for
the lease was to give them time to determine whether their work
would last.
Utah Excavating attempted to arrange financing right
up until the time the equipment was leased to Salt Lake County.
(T. 256, 257).
All of the parties recognized and agreed, and the
Court found that the lease would continue and the option could
be exercised at any time after the minimum six month period
for so long as Utah Excavating desired if they were not in
default under the agreement.

(T. 139, 171, 172, 203, 240, 266,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8267, 294, 311, 312).

Arnold was even willing to return the

equipment to Utah Excavating after i t had been repossessed
if the payments were brought current.

(T. 321).

Mr. Johns did contemplate what the machine would be
worth after six months, but had not made any calculations as
to an exact figure.

(T. 190).

Mr. Balls was the partner

knowledgeable as to equipment values.
Utah Excavating did not terminate the lease, but
attempted to arrange financing even after the equipment was
returned (T. 256, 257).
Salt Lake County paid five months rent totaling
$22,000.

(T. 142).

The purchase option price to the County

after five months would have been $67,250.

(T. 142).

County did not elect to not exercise its option.
required by law to ask for public bids.

The

It was

(T. 143).

The Court did not state that it was a waste of its
time to consider the intention of the parties as to when the
option would be exercised and did not preclude the presentation
of evidence on that issue (T. 268).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE UTAH EXCAVATING HAD THE OPTION TO BECOME THE
OWNER OF THE EQUIPMENT FOR NO ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION, THE
LEASE WAS INTENDED FOR SECURITY AS A MATTER OF LAW.
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-9The application of Article 9 of the Utah Uniform
Conunercial Code (U.C.C.) to leases is set forth by U.C.A. §
70A-9-102(2) which states:
This chapter applies to security
interests created by contract including
pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage,
chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien,
equipment trust, conditional sale, trust
receipt, other lien or title retention
contract and lease or consignment intended
as security.
Also, U.C.A. § 70A-l-201(37) provides:
Whether a lease is intended as security
is to be determined by the facts of each
case, however, (a) the inclusion of an option
to purchase does not of itself make a lease
one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of
the lease the lessee shall become or has the
option to become the owner of the property
for no additional consideration for a nominal
consideration does make the lease one intended
for security.
In Peco, Inc. v. Hartbauer Tool & Die Co., 500
P.2d 708, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 383 (Oreg. 1972) the court discussed
the above quoted provision of the U.C.C. and said:
At first glance the provisions
of the above section may be somewhat
confusing, probably because they are
stated in the inverse order of importance.
However, upon a careful reading of the
entire section it is clear that the first
question to be answered is that posed by
clause (b) - - whether the lessee may obtain
the property for no additional consideration
or for a nominal consideration. If so, the
lease is intended for security. If not, it
is then necessary to determine "by the facts
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-10of each case" whether the lease is intended
as security and, in making that determination,
the fact that the lease contains an option to
purchase "does not of itself make the lease
one intended for security".
The cases construing the above section
have uniformally held that if the lessee,
upon compliance with the lease, has the
option to purchase the property for no
additional consideration, or for a nominal
consideration, the lease is a security
interest as a matter of law.
In the instant case the "Equipment Rental Agreement"
(Ex. 1-P) and the "Rental Equipment Purchase Option" (Ex. 2-P)
provided that the option could be exercised at any time until
termination of the Rental Agreement and that 100% of all rent
payments would apply toward purchase.
The termination provisions of the "Equipment Rental
Agreement" are as follows:
Arnold Machinery Company, Inc., • • •
hereinafter called the lessor, hereby
leases to Utah Excavating • • • hereinafter
called the lessee, for a minimum period of
six months and thereafter until the equipment is returned or until lessor terminates
the lease, the equipment hereinafter described,
according to the terms and provisions hereinafter stated
1. The rental period shall begin on
and include the date of shipment to the
lessee and shall end on and include the
date of return to.the lessor's warehouse
or receiving point. If equipment is kept
longer than the specified minimum rental
period, the rental shall continue at the
same rate, with a pro-ration of rentals
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-11on any combination of monthly, weekly or
daily rates which is to lessee's advantage.
8.
If for any other reason
lessee desires to discontinue the use of
said machinery or equipment, the only remedy
of lessee shall be to return the machinery
to lessor and terminate this contract as
here and elsewhere provided for.
9.
• • • The lessor reserves the right
to remove the equipment at lessee's expense
from the job at any time when in its opinion
the equipment is in danger because of strikes
or any other condition.
15.
• • • The lessor • • • shall have the
privilege of removing said machinery and equipment on 24 hours notice if it is being overloaded or taxed beyond its capacity or in any
other manner abused or neglected.
17. Should any of the provisions of this
lease be violated by lessee the rental for the
entire period herein specified may, at the
option of lessor, become forthwith due and
payable and the lessor, or its agents may,
without notice, enter the premises occupied
by lessee without being a trespasser thereon
and take possession of and remove said equipment with or without process of law.
Thus, Arnold was given the right to terminate the
agreement for certain enumerated causes including Utah Excavating's default, but if there was no default or other cause
to terminate the agreement it was to continue.

Utah Excavating

was given the right to return the equipment and terminate the
agreement.
By applying 100% of all the $3,900 per month rent

payments toward the purchase after 36 months $140,400 would
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have been paid, which arcount is in excess of the purchase price
of $92,220 plus the option charge at that time of $41,499, which
together total $133, 719 (T. 43).

The excess of $6, 681 would be

available to cover any repair costs incurred by Arnold and Utah
Excavating could become the owner for no additional considerati on.
A case which is squarely on point with the instant
case is United Rental Equipment Company, Inc. v. Potts and
Callahan Contracting Company, Inc., et al., 231 Md. 552, 191
A.2d 570 (1963), in which the court stated:
The following facts are revealed by
the record. On August 19, 1960, United
Rental F,quipment Company, Inc. (United)
transferred possession and the right of
use of • • • [the equipment] • • • to one
Edward Wuensche under a document entitled
"Crane Rental Contract" which recited that
the compressor and other i terns of mechanical
equip:rrent were leased by United to Wuensche
and set forth provisions as to the use,
operation and maintenance of the equipment.
It was provided that the rental would be
$800 per month for the compressor for a
minimum period of one month and that
'after expiration of the minimum term •
the lessee shall pay • • • the same rental
per month • • • until the aforesaid equipment is returned to the lessor' • •
In the agreement the lessee agreed to
pay all sales and use taxes.
The lessor
reserved the right to terminate the lease
at any time if the equipment was being overloaded, abused or neglected, or if i t was
in danger because of strikes or other conditions, or for violation by the lessee of
any provisions of the lease. It was agreed
also that eighty-five percent of the rental
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-13of the compressor was to be applied on the
specified purchase price thereof of $14,500.

* * *
We think the agreement was a security
interest created by contract • • •
United argues that the lease was only
for a term of one month, that neither lessor
nor lessee could extend it without the consent
of the other at the time and that either could
arbitrarily terminate the lease at any time
after the expiration of the first month.
On the premise the lease was but for one month,
it is argued that Wuensche had neither the
right nor the option to become a purchaser of
the compressor at the expiration of the some
21 months it would take for the application
of eighty-five percent of the $800 rronthly
rental to the purchase price to aggregate
$14,500.
We do not so read the agreement, we think
the parties contemplated the purchase of the
compressor by Wuensche if he continued to pay
the specified monthly rental and otherwise
complied with the lease. The lease says:
After expiration of the minimum
term herein set forth, the lessee
shall pay to the lessor the same
rental per month as hereinabove provided • • • said rental shall start
from the date of original shipment
to the above designated site and shall
continue until the aforesaid equipment
is returned to the lessor.
The only option given the lessor to
terminate the lease is for enumerated causes.
This is consistent with an extended period
of rental payments to be determined solely
by the lessee.
Similarly in the instant case upon compliance with the
terms of the lease Utah Excavating had the option to become
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-14the owner of the equipment for no additional consideration and,
thus, the lease was intended for security as a matter of law.
POINT II
FURTHERMORE, BECAUSE UTAH EXCAVATING HAD THE OPTION
TO BECOME THE OWNER OF THE EQUIPMENT FOR A NOMINAL CONSIDERATION, THE LEASE WAS INTENDED FOR SECURITY AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In FMA Financial Corporation v. Pro-Printers, 590
P.2d 803

(Utah 1979), this Court set out three tests for

determining what constitutes nominal consideration under U.C.A.
§ 70A-l-201(37).

TFST 1.

COMPARE THE OPTION PRICE WITH '!HE ORIGINAL

LIST PRICE OR COST OF THE PROPERTY.
The original list price of the property was $98,000
when Arnold purchased it from the manufacturer in April, 1977,
(T. 135), and $92,220 when Utah Excavating executed its agreement with Arnold on December 30, 1977.

(Ex. 2-P).

The option

price is determined at the time the option is to be exercised
as follows:

Purchase price ($92,220) plus purchase option

charge ($92,220 x 1-1/4% x number of months) -

100% of total

payments ( $3, 90 0 x number of months) plus cost of major repairs
necessitated by ordinary wear and tear (Ex. 2-P).

This would

be:
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-15Date

Option Price

June 30, 1978

December 30, 1978
March 30, 19 78
December 30, 1979
December 30, 1980

% of List
% of List Price
Price ($92,220} at $98,000

$ 75,736.50
59,253.00
51,011. 25
26, 286. 00
(- 6,681.00}
Payments Exceed
Op ti on Price

~~----~...:...-~~~

82%
64%
55%
29%
0%

77%
60%
52%
27%
0%

The option prices listed above do not include the
cost of major repairs which were $736.96 for the first six
months and i t was estimated that they would be approximately
$3,000 per year although the witness listed several items in
that figure which are not major repairs.

(T. 297).

"Nominal consideration may be more than a few dollars,"
Peco, supra at 38 5.

An option price "should only be char-

acterized as substantial, or nominal, when considered in relation to some other amount."
9 14

Crown Cartridge Corp. , 220 F .Supp.

( S • D • N. Y • 19 6 2) •
After December 30, 1979, which would.be more than 24

months after the lease was executed the option price would have
been less than 25% of the list price and that percentage would
have decreased until 36 months at which time no consideration
would have been required to exercise the option.
TEST 2.

COMPARE THE OPTION PRICE WITH "SENSIBLE

ALTERNATIVES."
The excavator had a useful life of between five and
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-16six years before a rebuild of $20,000 would extend its life
(T. 137-138).

three or four more years.

Arnold's salesman

represented that Utah Excavating was building up an "equity"
with each payment.

(T. 131).

$23,400 (6 x $3,900).

That equity after six months was

For Utah Excavating to forfeit an equicy

of $23,400 on a machine that had a remaining useful life of
about five years would not be a sensible alternative if there
was any way to avoid it.

Of course, the amount of the for-

feiture increases to $46,800 after 12 months, $64,800 after

18 months, and $93,600 after 24 months.

The longer the agree-

ment continued the less sensible i t became for Utah Excavating
to not exercise the option.
In In Re Royer's Bakery, Inc., 1

u.c.c.

Rep. 342

(E.D.Pa. 1963), where 80% of all rentals paid applied to the
purchase price the court held:
A provision such as this in the lease
readily provides a devise for financing
the purchase of equipment. By crediting
earlier payments of rent to the purchase
price, the lessee is accorded an equity or
pecuniary interest in the subject matter
of the lease which he may recover at his
option.
It would seem therefore, that whenever
i t can be found that a lease agreement concerning personal property contains provisions
the effect of which are to create in the lessee
an equity or pecuniary interest in the leased
pr9perty the parties are deemed as a matter of
law to have intended the lease as security • • • •
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-17TEST 3.

COMPARE THE OPTION PRICE TO THE FAIR MARKET

VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME THE OPTION IS TO BE EXERCISED.
This is the most relevant test in determining whether
the option price is nominal.

FMA, supra, at 806.

In Comment, Leases as Security Agreements and the Effect
of a Failure to Notify on a Secured Party's Recovery of a Deficiency Judgment:

FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 1979 Utah

Law Review 567 at 569 i t states:
It has been argued that the difference
between a true lease and a secured transaction
hinges upon whether the lessee acquires an
equity of ownership through his rental payments,
i.e. does the rent amount 'to a credit against
the payment which the lessee must ultimately
make in order to acquire title'. In this context an option price which is significantly
less than the fair market value of the property
at the end of the lease suggests that the 'lessee'
has been building up equity through rental payments.
A comparison of the option price with the estimated
fair market value of the equipment as Mr. Balls anticipated
i t would be at the time of executing the lease is as follows:
Fair Market
Value

Date
June 30, 1978
December 30, 1978
March 30, 1979
December 30, 1979
December 30, 1980

$90,000.00
86,000.00
81,000.00
78,000.00
70,000.00

Option Price

% of Fair
Market Value

$ 75,736.50
59,253.00
51, 011. 25
26,286.00
Payments exceed
Option Price

84%

69%
63%
34%

0%

Commentators have suggested that based on an analysis
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-18of the decided cases an option price which is less than 50% or
even 80% of the fair market value should be considered nominal.
Leary, Leasing and Other Techniques of Financing Equipment
Under the

u.c.c.,

42 Temp. L.Q. 217, 250 (1969) and Peden,

The Treatment of Equipment Leas es as Security Agreements Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 110, 144
(1971).
In the instant case the 80% mark is reached shortly
after six months and the 50% mark at approximately 18 months.
After 36 months Utah Excavating could become the owner of an
excavator worth $70,000 having a useful life of from two to
three years for no additional consideration.
The continuation of the agreement and the exercise of
the option at 36 months was a very realistic and reasonable
alternative.

The option charge at that time would have been

$41,499 ($92,220 x 1-1/4% x 36).

Figured on a purchase price

of $92,220 over three years this is the equivalent of 15%
interest per year ($92,220 x 15% x 3).
Considering all three tests it is clear that Utah
Excavating upon compliance with the terms of the agreement
had the option to become the owner of the excavator for a
nominal consideration and, therefore, the lease was intended
for security as a matter of law.
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-19POINT III
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT BASED ON THE FACTS OF
THE CASE THE EQUIPMENT RENTAL AGREEMENT WAS INTENDED AS
SECURITY SHOULD BE SUSTAINED ON APPEAL.
In First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co.,
27 U.2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971) this court stated:
• • • We survey the evidence in
the light favorable to the trial courts
findings • • • Where the appellants position is that the trial court erred in
refusing to make certain findings essential to its right to recover, and insists
that the evidence compel such findings,
i t is obliged to show that there is
credible and uncontradicted evidence which
proves those contended facts with such
certainty that all reasonable minds must
so find.
Conversely, if there is any reasonable
basis either in the evidence or from the lack
of evidence upon which reasonable minds might
conclude that they are not so convinced by a
preponderence of the evidence, then the
findings should not be overturned.
Arnold's primary contention on appeal is that the
trial judge was mistaken in finding that the Equipment Rental
Agreement could have continued after the six months minimum
term and that Arnold neither intended to terminate nor had the
right to terminate the agreement so long as Utah Excavating
remained current in their payments.

Based on the evidence

and testimony of the parties the trial judge ruled:
My immediate construction right now
is that if the parties remain current in
their payments that this lease could have

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20gone on indefinitely, under the wording of
this particular lease, unless they violated
one of the provisions hereinafter provided
for in the lease. And if they violate those
provisions then they have cause or grounds
to set it aside. I think that was the
intent of the parties. It appears from the
testimony that I have heard in this matter
thus far. • • • I think you are correct when
you state, of course, that the testimony is
that they expect to convert it. But I think
under the terms of the lease, if that expectation didn't materialize, they could have continued to lease it.
(T. 312).
There is ample evidence to sustain this finding (T.
139, 171, 172, 203, 240, 266, 267, 294).

The only other testi-

mony relating to this question is that the parties expected to
exercise the option after six months.

(T. 212, 234) •

This

expectation was in no way limiting on Utah Excavating's right
or ability to exercise the option at any time after six months
if i t desired or needed for whatever reason to continue under
the :Equipment Rental Agreement.

As discussed earlier at page

18, that was not an unrealistic or unreasonable alternative
from a financial standpoint.

Therefore, the trial Court's

finding on this factual matter should not be disturbed.
The appellant has stressed that Utah Excavating
entered into a "lease" rather than a "conditional sales contract."

Th is is of little significance in determining whether

the "lease" was intended for security.
Indust., Inc., 3

u.c.c.

In In Re Transcontinen~

Rep. 235 (N.D.Ga. 1965), the court stated
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-21In determining the real character
of a contract, courts will always look
to its purpose rather than to the name
given to i t by the parties.
The purpose of the Equipment Rental Agreement in the instant
case was to enable Utah Excavating to acquire an equity in
the excavator.

(T. 131).

An analysis of the terms and provisions of the agree-

ment (Ex. 1-P) reveals that the "lessee" bears all of the risks
and burdens except performing major repairs necessitated by
ordinary wear and tear (Ex. 1-P, paragraph 3), and even this
expense is reimbursed when the option is exercised.
paragraph 3).

(E~.

2-P,

The lessee_ anong other things pays for all

other maintenance, bears the risk of loss because of defects,
pays all taxes, bears the risk of any damage, and pays for
insurance.

(Ex. 1-P) •

In view of all the evidence that exists to support
the trial court's finding that the agreement was intended for
security, this court should sustain that finding.

Appellant

has not shown any credible and uncontradicted evidence which
proves the facts i t contends with such certainty that all
reasonable minds must so find as it must do to enable this
court to overturn the.trial court's finding.
POINT IV
NO DEFICIENCY EXISTED AND EVEN IF ONE HAD EXISTED
ARNOLD WOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO IT BECAUSE IT FAILED TO GIVE
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-22UTAH EXCAVATING THE NOTICE OF SALE REQUIRED BY u.c.A. § 70A9-504 (3).
The consequence of the Equipment Rental Agreement
being found to be intended for security is that the remedies
available to Arnold upon Utah Excavating' s default are governed
by U.C.A. 70A-9-504{3) which states:
• • • Unless collateral is perishable
or threatens to decline speedily in value
or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification
of the time and place of any public sale or
reasonable notification of the time after
which any private sale or other intended
disposition is to be made shall be sent by
the secured party to the debtor, if he has
not signed after default a stateIIEnt renouncing
or modifying his right to notification of sale.
In FMA Financial Corporation v. Pro-Printers, supra,
regarding deficiency judgments, this court stated:
In an action for a deficiency judgment
such as this the secured party has the burden
of establishing that the disposition of the
property was done in a conmercially reasonable
manner, and that reasonable notice to the
debtor was given.

* * *
• • • Many courts have held the secured
party may obtain no deficiency from the debtor
if it fails to give the debtor reasonable
notice {590.P.2d at 806, 807).
The main objectives of the notice requirement are to give
the debtor an opportunity to exercise his rights to redeem
the collateral and to allow him to insure the commercial
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-23reasonableness of the sale.

It is not a burdensome require-

ment on the secured party, but the failure to provide the
notice can have severe consequences upon the debtor.

The law

abhors a forfeiture which results from failure to give a notice
of sale.

Utah Excavating was still trying to arrange financing

to protect its equity when without notice the equipment was
disposed of.
The option price upon execution of the agreement
was $92,220.
to Arnold.

Utah Excavating paid $15,600 in rent payments
Arnold received $22,000 in rent payments and

$66,400 on the sale of the equipment from Salt Lake County,
making a total of $104,000 i t received on a piece of equipment
having a purchase price of $92,220.

In view of this it is

difficult to understand how Arnold can claim that any deficiency
exists on the equipment.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law the Equipment Rental Agreement was

intended for security because Utah Excavating upon compliance
with the terms of the agreement had the option to become the
owner of the excavator for no additional consideration or
for a nominal consideration.

The trial court's finding that

the agreement was intended for security should be sustained.
Because Arnold failed to give Utah Excavating the required
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-24notice of sale, i t would not be entitled to a deficiency
judgment even if one existed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
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M. Richards
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